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Abstract
I argue that a common philosophical approach to the interpretation of physical
theories – particularly quantum field theories – has led philosophers astray. It has
driven many to declare the quantum field theories employed by practicing physi-
cists, so-called “effective field theories,” to be unfit for philosophical interpretation.
In particular, such theories have been deemed unable to support a realist interpreta-
tion. I argue that these claims are mistaken: attending to the manner in which these
theories are employed in physical practice, I show that interpreting effective field
theories yields a robust foundation for a more refined approach to scientific realism
in the context of quantum field theory. The paper concludes by briefly sketching
some general morals for interpretive practice in the philosophy of physics.
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1 Introduction
There are two central strands of contemporary philosophy of science which sit in ten-
sion. On the one hand, there is the increasing desire of philosophers of science to ensure
that their philosophical commitments are grounded in our most successful scientific the-
ories. This is often considered part and parcel of adopting a ‘naturalistic’ approach to
philosophical investigation1. On the other hand is a currently widespread approach to
the interpretation of physical theories. According to this approach, the central interpre-
tive task of the philosopher is to answer the following counterfactual question: “if this
theory provided a true description of the world in all respects, what would the world
be like?” Given what we know about the restricted validity of the descriptions of the
world provided by even our best physical theories, this sits uneasily with the interpretive
question that follows more naturally from paying heed to scientific practice2: “given that
this theory provides an approximately true description of our world, what is our world
approximately like?”
My aim in this paper is to offer one way of resolving this tension. In the context of
quantum field theory, I distinguish these two interpretive projects and argue that adopting
the modern understanding of quantum field theories as ‘effective theories’ renders the
prevailing counterfactual approach to theory interpretation at best unmotivated, and at
worst misleading. Fortunately, effective quantum field theories provide philosophers with
a superior starting point for interpretational questions, even according to the criteria that
purportedly motivate prevailing interpretive practice. In particular, they enable one to
answer in the affirmative the question that (Ruetsche [2011]) takes to be binding on any
purported interpretation of a physical theory: “does this interpretation allow the theory
to discharge all of its scientific duties?” In fact, in the context of quantum field theory it
is only by attending to effective theories that one can satisfy this criterion.
It is especially profitable to attend to effective theories in order to answer questions
about the ontological implications of quantum field theories. Since a number of philoso-
phers of physics view effective theories as an ad hoc solution to certain mathematical
problems in quantum field theory, or merely as tools for extracting empirical predictions
which convey no ontological guidance (for example, (Halvorson and Müger [2006]),
(Fraser [2009]), (Kuhlmann [2010]), (Fraser [2011]), and (Butterfield and Bouatta [2015],
section 5.2)), I will argue for this position at some length in section 3.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I review what I deem the Standard
Account of theory interpretation before providing reasons to be dissatisfied with it. Sec-
tion 3 is a detailed discussion of the virtues that interpreting effective theories promises
for scientific realism. I argue that it yields a more robust and scientifically informed set
of realist commitments than the Standard Account. I conclude in section 4 with some
1For example, naturalism of a particularly appealing sort is exemplified by (Maddy
[2007]) or (Wimsatt [2007]), or many papers in (Ross et al. [2013]).
2This phrasing can be found in (Fraser [2011]), where it is used to describe the
preferred interpretive question of (Wallace [2011]). It is also endorsed by (Baker [2015],
section 2), although I disagree with Baker about the sense in which quantum field theory
can rightly be called “approximately true” in a way that leaves me unconvinced by the
argument he goes on to give in section 2 of that paper.
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brief, general comments on interpretive practice in the philosophy of physics.
Finally, a brief terminological note. Effective quantum field theories (EFTs) are quan-
tum field theories that become inapplicable beyond some short distance scale, and that
incorporate this inapplicability into their mathematical framework. Throughout the pa-
per I will use the phrase “effective quantum field theory” in a slightly broader sense than
sometimes displayed in the physics literature. The only significance of this here is that
quantum field theories given a mathematically exact definition on a spacetime lattice will
be labeled as EFTs, in addition to those that incorporate their limited domain of applica-
bility into their perturbative approximation3.
2 The Standard Account of Theory Interpretation
Philosophers of physics occasionally offer remarks about what it means to give an inter-
pretation of a physical theory, but more frequently they get to the business of interpreting
without a metaphilosophical preamble. In this section my aim is to extract a handful of
principles that strike me as shared ground among many philosophers of physics regarding
what it means to interpret a physical theory. These make up what I label the Standard
Account, or Standard Interpretation, and its practitioners I call Standard Interpreters. I
should note that I do not have in mind any particular author or set of authors as per-
fect examples of Standard Interpreters. The Standard Account is meant to reflect a set
of assumptions that are at least tacitly assumed by many working in the philosophy of
physics; in any given paper those authors might exhibit many (but not necessarily all) of
the principles that I group together under the heading of the Standard Account. That said,
after outlining the Standard Account, I will substantiate it with a representative sample
of quotations from philosophers of physics addressing the question of what it means to
interpret a physical theory.
The ingredients I take to be integral to the Standard Account are4:
1. The theory to be interpreted is assumed to provide a true and exhaustive description
of the physical world in all respects, including at all length scales.
2. A theory is to be interpreted in isolation. It is illicit to appeal to, say, quantum
mechanics to shed light on interpretational questions in classical physics, or to the
3See (Georgi [1989]), (Duncan [2012]), or (Petrov and Blechman [2015]) for
accessible introductions to EFTs, or (Williams [2015], section 2) for a much briefer
introduction aimed at philosophers.
4What I call the Standard Account has some overlap with what (Ruetsche [2011])
calls ‘pristine interpretation’. I hasten to add that Ruetsche does not endorse the practice
of pristine interpretation, and in its stead offers an account of theory interpretation that
requires interpreters to be engaged with how physical theories are employed in practice.
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inevitability of gravitational effects at short distances to resolve an interpretational
difficulty in quantum field theory5.
3. An interpretation of a theory consists of the set of all worlds nomologically possible
according to that theory.
4. This set of possible worlds is determined by generic structural features of the theory
in question. These may include its dynamical laws, certain kinematical constraints
(the symmetries of its space of physically allowed states, for example), and so on.
Information about empirical applications of the theory – how it is employed in
scientific practice – are largely or entirely ignored
5. The goal of interpreting a physical theory is to identify and characterize its funda-
mental ontological features.
Now for some evidence. Consider the following descriptions of theory interpretation
offered by philosophers of physics:
• (Earman [2004], p. 1234): “Whatever else it means to interpret a scientific theory,
it means saying what the world would have to be like if the theory is true.”
• (Van Fraassen [1991], p. 242): “Hence we come to the question of interpretation:
Under what conditions is the theory true? What does it say the world is like? These
two questions are the same.”
• (Belot [1998], p. 532): “To interpret a theory is to describe the possible worlds
about which it is the literal truth. Thus, an interpretation of electromagnetism
seems to tell us about a possible world which we know to be distinct from our
own.”6
• (Fraser [2009], p. 558): “By ‘interpretation’ I mean the activity of giving an answer
to the following hypothetical question: ‘If QFT were true, what would reality be
like?’ ”
5This is really a corollary of principle 1 – how could a physical theory that is
assumed to provide a true and complete description of the world be consistently
interpreted in anything but isolation? I list it as a separate principle merely for the sake
of emphasis.
6In the same paper, Belot does offer an account of how one can learn about our own
world by examining the interactions between theories we know to be merely effective,
but that we have interpreted as true in all respects. His account hinges on a
recommendation I heartily endorse – examining the relations between theories which we
know to be merely effective – but I do not see how his account can be consistent. In
particular, I do not see how one can consistently interpret theories as literally true in all
respects while advocating comparisons between theories in the domains in which the
two are taken to break down. It seems that strict commitment to the former rules out the
possibility of the latter.
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• (Ruetsche [2008], p. 199): “To interpret a physical theory is to say what the world
would be like, if the theory were true. A realist about a theory believes that theory
to be true.”
• (Arntzenius [2014], p. 4): “So, what is it that I am doing when I discuss what
the structure of space and time is according to classical mechanics, according to
quantum mechanics, and so on? What I am doing is discussing what we should
take the structure of the world to be if the phenomena were as classical mechanics,
or quantum mechanics, or...says they are. [...] On the other hand, it has to be said
that while it seems quite reasonable to expect that future science will have a huge
predictive overlap with current science, it is not so obvious that it will have a huge
overlap concerning the kind of fundamental structure that is the concern of this
book” (emphasis mine).
Consider two corollaries of the Principle 1. The first corollary is that one must also
banish other theories from consideration: to interpret some theory T is to interpret T in
isolation. It is illuminating to see how this corollary affects philosophical practice, and
the following discussion in (Fraser [2009], p. 552) provides a helpful example. She
notes that physicists and philosophers often appeal to the fact that quantum field theory
will be succeeded by a (currently-unknown) theory of quantum gravity at short distance
scales as one way of giving physical content to the short-distance cutoff present in EFTs,
and that some theories of quantum gravity suggest that spacetime may have a discrete
structure. She then argues that it would be mistaken to think that appeals to such theories
of quantum gravity could possibly do any interpretational work in EFTs because “even if
these claims are borne out, the fact that quantum gravity indicates that space is discrete
would not help settle the question of how to interpret the cutoff variant of QFT because
gravitational considerations are external to QFT” (emphasis mine). The conclusion she
draws is that EFTs are unfit for interpretation, in part due to difficulties she sees related
to interpreting the short-distance cutoff.
The second corollary is that the theory to be interpreted must have a rigorous math-
ematical description at all length scales. That is, after all, a necessary condition for
assuming a theory to be true in all respects (and being able to assume the theory’s truth
down to arbitrarily small length scales is necessary for interpreting the theory as making
claims about fundamental metaphysical structure). Acceptance of this mathematical pre-
condition for interpretation is what leads Halvorson, for instance, to state that “[i]n the
absence of some sort of mathematically intelligible description of QFT, the philosopher
of physics has two options: either find a new way to understand the task of interpreta-
tion, or remain silent about the interpretation of quantum field theory” (Halvorson and
Müger [2006], p. 731). Standardly Interpreting a physical theory, then, requires that it
be mathematically well-behaved even in domains where it fails qua physical theory: that
is, even in domains where we expect this mathematical description to fail to describe any
properties of the actual world.
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Principle 5 identifies another recurrent attitude one encounters in Standard Interpreta-
tions of physical theories, closely related to the assumption that the theory being studied
is true in all respects: the focus on identification of the fundamental structure of the phys-
ical theory being interpreted7. In such investigations, this is commonly identified with the
structure present in a theory at the smallest length scales, and in many cases this seems
to be uncritically assumed to capture the structure that is common to all length scales.
This emphasis on identifying fundamental structure means that the focus is often on the
ontology of the theory at arbitrarily small length scales, precisely the physical domain
in which one has good reasons to distrust the ontological information contained in any
extant physical theory8. For example, consider (Fraser [2008], p. 857), where she argues
that if particles do not exist at some fundamental level in quantum field theory, then “QFT
does not furnish grounds for regarding particlelike entities as constituents of reality.” This
is defended on the grounds that in order to take particles to be constituents of reality, “the
cogency of the distinction between fundamental and less fundamental entities must be
defended and a case must be made for admitting additional, non-fundamental entities
into our ontology” (p. 858). Similar claims are made by (North [2009], p. 23), where
she states that “if our world’s fundamental physical theory were the theory of classical
particles, we should conclude that the structure of the mathematical space in which to
best represent the theory, and of the world according to that theory, has only symplectic
structure” (my emphasis). These exemplify the Standard Interpreter’s emphasis on fun-
damental structure, as well as the tendency to equivocate between a theory’s ontological
content at the fundamental level and that content at all distances scales.
Surveying the principles of Standard Interpretation, one is impressed by the degree to
which they require a starting point for interpreting quantum field theories that differs from
the conceptual and mathematical framework that characterizes the modern understanding
of quantum field theories as EFTs. In fact, Standard Interpreters’ insistence on treating
a theory as true in all respects – in particular, at all length scales – has restricted them to
studying toy quantum field theories formulated in two or three dimensional spacetimes,
or features of the axiomatic framework in which those models are constructed. These
toy theories are furthermore quite structurally distinct from the quantum field theories
we know to be empirically successful in the real world9. One reason this restriction is
7This is fairly common in philosophy of physics and ubiquitous in the analytic
metaphysics literature, but even within the small subfield of the philosophy of quantum
field theory it is on display in (among other places) (Healey [2007]), (Fraser [2008]),
(Baker [2009]), (Baker [2010]), (Baker and Halvorson [2010]), (Arntzenius [2014]), and
the discussion in (Butterfield and Bouatta [2015], section 5.2)
8Thus the emphasis on identifying fundamental structure is also closely tied up with
Standard Interpreters’ demand that a physical theory have a rigorous mathematical
description at all length scales. My thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this
point.
9In particular, even in two or three spacetime dimensions these toy models are
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so remarkable is that it is commonplace for physicists to describe the recognition that
all quantum field theories break down at short distances, and the associated development
of the RG and the EFT framework, as the most significant conceptual advance in the
understanding of quantum field theory in the second half of the twentieth century10: as
(Rivasseau et al. [2014], p. 4) put it in their recent review of the RG, “the theory of
renormalization...that initially might have appeared as a computational trick, is now un-
derstood to be the heart of QFT.” Physicists generally regard the inevitable breakdown
of any EFT at short distances not as a disaster, but as offering profitable physical insight.
Among other advantages, it provides insight into the length scales at which physical pro-
cesses not included in the particular EFT they are working with become important, and
thus at which length scales their theory must be modified or replaced entirely.
Before turning to the vices of the Standard Account, I want to emphasize that I am not
suggesting that Standard Interpreters fail to recognize that classical mechanics, or general
relativity, or quantum field theory do not provide valid descriptions of our world at short
distances. They unquestionably do know this. This is part of what makes Standard
Interpretive practice so odd: they uniformly set this knowledge aside in order to pursue
Standard Interpretation, and then frequently double-down on the oddity by focusing their
philosophical attention on the identification of the theory’s ontology in precisely those
short-distance regions where one knows the theory’s description to be inadequate.
2.1 Vices of the Standard Account
The theoretical results currently available fall into two categories: rigorous
results on approximate models and approximate results on realistic models.
– (Wightman and Glance [1989])
Here I describe three serious problems with Standardly Interpreting quantum field the-
ory. I will be brief, for two reasons. First, because much of this ground has been covered
at length in (Wallace [2006]) and (Wallace [2011]), with whom I am almost entirely in
agreement. Second, because section 3 consists of a positive argument that interpreting
EFTs grounds ontological commitments that are more reliable than those any Standard
Interpretation of quantum field theory can provide, and I hope this argument will be more
persuasive than any purely critical discussion.
The central vice of Standard Interpretation, illustrated by the quote from (Halvorson
and Müger [2006]) cited earlier, is that it declares essentially all empirically applicable
quantum field theories to be unfit for interpretation. This is because no mathematically
unable to accommodate the local gauge symmetries that are necessary for formulating
the Standard Model of particle physics.
10For example, see (Weinberg [1983]), (Gross [1999]), (Weinberg [1999]),
(Zinn-Justin [1999]), (Banks [2008]), (Zee [2010]), (Duncan [2012]), (Cardy [2013]),
and many of the papers in (Baaquie et al. [2015]).
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rigorous version of the Standard Model – indeed, of any interacting QFT in four space-
time dimensions – has ever been constructed, and a rigorous mathematical model of a
physical theory is a precondition for providing a Standard Interpretation11. Quantum
field theories that satisfy the preconditions for Standard Interpretation are known to ex-
ist only in two or three spacetime dimensions, and lack many of the crucial structural
features that characterize the quantum field theories which describe our world, such as
invariance under local gauge symmetries. This means that in quantum field theory, the
question the Standard Interpreter aims to answer is actually worse than the counterfactual
starting point I attributed to Standard Interpretation at the outset of the paper. In quantum
field theory, the Standard Interpreter sets out to answer the following nested counterfac-
tual: “If we lived in a world with two (or three) spacetime dimensions, and if that world
could be described by a theory that we know is structurally incapable of describing our
world, and if that theory provided a complete and exhaustive description of that two (or
three) dimensional world in all respects, what would that world be like?” The answer to
this question is then purported to offer insight into the ontology of the world in which we
do, in fact, reside.
A second vice stems from this inability to Standardly Interpret empirically applicable
quantum field theories. The manner in which a physical theory is employed in real-world
applications offers valuable guidance about which elements of that theory’s mathematical
framework play a genuinely representational role and which are likely just mathematical
artifacts. The absence of applications for the quantum field theories preferred by Stan-
dard Interpreters thus makes their proposed interpretations even less reliable. Again, this
is not just in the general sense that one may reasonably have more confidence in the ap-
proximate truth of empirically successful theories, but also in the more specific sense that
their preferred toy theories lack an important tool for providing a fine-grained separation
of ontological wheat from mathematical chaff. Explaining how this works in EFTs is
addressed in detail in section 3.
The rectitude of Standard Interpretation is not always just assumed. There have been
arguments presented in its favor – in particular, arguments for ignoring EFTs in favor
of attempting to extract ontological information by answering the nested counterfactual
given above (for example, (Fraser [2009]), (Kuhlmann [2010]), (Fraser [2011]), or (Baker
[2013])). However, these arguments reveal a third vice of adhering to Standard Interpre-
tive methodology: it can generate conclusions we have good reason to believe (at best)
non sequiturs, and (at worst) false. As one example, consider the argument in (Fraser
11By “rigorous mathematical model” I mean a model that satisfies the Wightman
axioms (or some similar set of axioms). In the case of theories which are not
asymptotically free (or asymptotically safe), there is positive reason to suspect that no
rigorous mathematical model could ever be constructed (see for example (Rivasseau
[1991])). For theories that are asymptotically free (or asymptotically safe), it is
suspected such a mathematically consistent extension is possible, but no one knows how
to provide one yet (Douglas [2004]).
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[2009]) that the lack of a rigorous mathematical model of quantum field theory in four
spacetime dimensions renders it unsuitable for interpretation. Fraser’s argument takes the
form of a reductio ad absurdum: she considers an EFT whose breakdown at some short
distance L is captured by representing space as a lattice with lattice spacing L. Adher-
ence to Standard Interpretational methodology (that the description of the world offered
by the theory be treated as true and exhaustive, for instance) leads her to conclude that
the theory assigns a lattice structure to physical space. Thus, she continues, since no one
believes that quantum field theory entails that physical space has a lattice structure, EFTs
are unfit for interpretation12. Of course, the upshot of any reductio is just that some set of
assumptions is inconsistent; one then identifies the assumption(s) to be discarded based
on whatever considerations are most appropriate within the context of the investigation.
An alternative response to discovering that one’s approach to theory interpretation gen-
erates a conclusion that no one believes is to conclude that it may be the approach to
interpretation that is unfit for interpretive work, not the theory.
The three objections to Standard Interpretations of quantum field theories that I’ve
offered are: (i) it requires replacing questions about the actual world (answerable by
investigating empirically successful EFTs) with questions about remote counterfactual
worlds, to be answered by interpreting toy quantum field theories; (ii) the lack of empiri-
cal applications of the quantum field theories preferred by Standard Interpreters weakens
even further the realism such investigations can support; and (iii) it is prone to generating
absurd ontological conclusions due to artifical restrictions on what information one is
allowed to take into account when interpreting a physical theory.
One may worry that allowing the way a theory is applied in practice to inform its
interpretation in the fashion I am encouraging makes the endeavor troublingly pragmatic,
and so threatens to undercut any strongly realist interpretation of quantum field theory. I
think that it strengthens our realist commitments, and it is to that issue that I turn now.
3 A More Effective Realism
Adopting EFTs as an object of interpretation necessitates an approach distinct from Stan-
dard Interpretation. Most obviously, it requires giving up the assumption that the theory
provides a true and complete description of the world in all respects. It is part and par-
cel of treating a physical theory as effective to accept that it does not provide such a
description. The emphasis on characterizing the fundamental ontology of the EFT also
becomes unmotivated, since the fact that the theory offers no reliable information about
12Fraser doesn’t consider any of the myriad ways of incorporating the short-distance
breakdown of EFTs that don’t involve formulating the theory on a spatial lattice, but her
argument is easy to extend to such cases. For example, it is also the case that no one
believes our world has a non-integer number of spacetime dimensions, so EFTs whose
breakdown is incorporated through dimensional regularization are unsuitable for
interpretation. And so on.
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our world at ‘fundamental’ length scales is built directly into the formalism. Further-
more, in some cases (though not all) one will have to develop a stomach for interpreting
physical theories that fail to live up to mathematicians’ standards of mathematical rigor13.
Finally, interpreting the theory in isolation becomes unmotivated as well, since appeals
to (currently unknown) short-distance physics are integral to understanding the physical
significance of the short-distance breakdown of EFTs. What philosophical payoffs can
EFTs offer to justify these required departures from prevailing interpretational practice?
In this section I argue that an approach to scientific realism that has become popular
over the last 20 years or so falls naturally out of an attempt to interpret EFTs. Origi-
nally born out of attempts to respond to the pessimistic meta-induction, this approach to
realism focuses on particular scientific theories and attempts to identify a subset of the
entities and structures in the theory that can be expected to survive future episodes of
theory change14. One can identify two prongs to this approach, which (Psillos [1999])
labels the ‘divide and conquer’ strategy: (i) attend to the details of a theory’s empirical
applications to distinguish those entities and structures that play an essential or ‘active’
role in the theory’s empirical success from those that are merely ‘idle constituents’; and
(ii) identify those theoretical elements that are stable and “robust” (in a sense to be made
more precise in a moment).
The many empirical applications of EFTs and the availability of the RG play crucial
roles in carrying out this divide and conquer strategy in quantum field theory. In doing
so, they provide a corrective to a common attitude of Standard Interpreters that (Stachel
[1993], p. 149) calls ‘the fetishism of mathematics’15: “the tendency to assume that
all the mathematical elements introduced in the formalization of a physical theory must
necessarily correspond to something meaningful in the physical theory and, even more,
in the world that the physical theory purports to help us understand.” At least within the
context of quantum field theory, they also offer one avenue of response to perhaps the
most significant challenge facing the divide and conquer strategy: the need for a criterion
that can be applied now “to pick out those parts or features of our own theories we may
safely regard as accurate descriptions of the natural world” (Stanford [2006], p. 169).
The criterion that suggests itself as a response to Stanford’s challenge is Wimsatt’s
13Although pursuing it would take me too far afield, it is worth noting that I think
many philosophers underestimate the extent to which this standard fails to be met in
many other domains of physics as well, especially once one attends to the mathematical
trickery needed to extract empirically adequate predictions from those theories.
14Varieties of this approach can be found in (Kitcher [1993]), (Psillos [1999]), and
(Chakravartty [2007]), among other places. I consider the “local” realism of (Wimsatt
[2007]) also to be a realism of this sort, though his motivations have nothing to do with
the pessimistic meta-induction.
15Related concerns have recently been raised by (Curiel [2016]), (Weatherall [2016]),
and (Lehmkuhl [forthcoming]) concerning certain interpretive strategies in the
philosophical literature on general relativity.
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notion of ‘robustness’16. Wimsatt offers a criterion for ontological commitment that I
will adopt going forward: one should include in one’s ontology those entities, proper-
ties, or relationships which are ‘robust’: “accessible (detectable, measurable, derivable,
definable, producible, or the like) in a variety of independent ways” (Wimsatt [2007], p.
95). I will argue that the host of empirical applications and the use of the RG play pow-
erful roles in determining which properties, entities, and structures in a given EFT are
robust. Before making that argument, a brief example may be helpful for getting a feel
for Wimsatt’s robustness criterion. A paradigmatic instance of a robustness argument
for the reality of some entity is Jean Perrin’s argument for the existence of molecules
in the early twentieth century. Perrin performed a variety of different experiments that
yielded independent but convergent calculations of Avagadro’s number, which represents
the number of (then-hypothetical) molecules needed in a substance such that its mass in
grams equals its molecular mass (what one now calls a mole of the substance). Perrin
then concluded that
Even if no other information were available as to the molecular magnitudes,
such constant results would justify the very suggestive hypotheses that have
guided us [including that molecules exist], and we should certainly accept
as extremely probable the values obtained with such concordance for the
masses of the molecules and atoms...The objective reality of the molecules
therefore becomes hard to deny. – (Perrin [1916], p. 106) (quoted in (Achin-
stein [2002], p. 473); emphasis in original)
On the basis of the stability of his experimental and calculational results across distinct
and independent physical conditions, Perrin thus concludes that molecules are elements
of reality. This captures the general structure of robustness arguments well17.
There are several ways in which EFTs can enhance the reliability of our realist com-
mitments. First, they contribute to the advancement of the divide and conquer strategy by
clarifying the sense in which quantum field theories are “approximately true”. EFTs do
this by (i) explicitly incorporating into their mathematical framework the length scales
beyond which they become unreliable, making explicit the physical domains in which
one can trust the theory to deliver reliable ontological information; and (ii) using the RG
to provide a means of identifying elements of EFTs that are invariant across indepen-
dent and distinct choices about how to model the physics at the short distances where
the theory is empirically inapplicable. These are two senses in which the RG identifies
‘robust’ structures in EFTs, thereby offering guidance about which structures in that EFT
represent physical content and which are just mathematical artifacts.
16Wimsatt’s description of his own ‘local’ realism based on robustness is (in brief)
(Wimsatt [2007], p.95) and (at length) (Wimsatt [2007], chapter 4).
17To my knowledge, the earliest use of Perrin’s argument by a philosopher in support
of scientific realism is (Salmon [1984]). My thanks to an anonymous referee for
bringing Salmon’s use of Perrin’s argument to my attention.
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Second, focusing on elements of EFTs that the RG shows to be robust reveals a rich,
layered ontology that is hidden if one shares Standard Interpreters’ focus on fundamental
structure (of non-fundamental theories, remember!). The RG reveals that the ontology
that Standard Interpretations generate is impoverished, presenting a misleading picture
of the structures and entities that populate the actual world. Indeed, I will argue that for
certain quantum field theories a Standard Interpretational ontology renders them unable
to discharge their scientific duties, thereby violating the requirement for interpretational
success suggested by (Ruetsche [2011]). The following two subsections substantiate and
expand on these claims.
I should note before proceeding that the belief that EFTs provide more reliable realist
commitments is at odds with a widespread attitude of the philosophy of physics commu-
nity18. This attitude is captured well by the remark of (Butterfield and Bouatta [2015],
p. 25) that studying EFTs “suggests a rather opportunistic or instrumentalist attitude
to quantum field theories. [...] Meanwhile...results showing some quantum field theo-
ries’ good [mathematical] behaviour at arbitrarily high energies [= at arbitrarily short
length scales] foster a less opportunistic or instrumentalist attitude.” A similar attitude
is espoused in (Halvorson and Müger [2006]), (MacKinnon [2008]), (Fraser [2009]),
(Kuhlmann [2010]), (Ruetsche [2011]), and (Fraser [2011]). Undermining this attitude
is the aim of the following two subsections.
3.1 Approximate Truth
Although this may seem a paradox, all exact science is dominated by the
idea of approximation. When a man tells you he knows the exact truth about
anything, you are safe in inferring that he is an inexact man. – (Russell
[1931])
The notion of ‘approximate truth’ employed in most traditional formulations of sci-
entific realism is both (i) of central importance, since we know our current scientific
theories aren’t exactly true, and (ii) sufficiently opaque as to function as little more than
an acknowledgment of this fact. The divide and conquer strategy aims to improve this by
identifying elements of a theory that are crucial to its empirical success (as opposed to
the ‘idle posits’ of the theory that are not), and by identifying robust entities and struc-
tures that are likely to survive episodes of theory change; ideally these two sets will have
considerable overlap. In this section I highlight several ways in which EFTs represent a
significant improvement on this situation19.
First, they provide explicit guidance about the domains in which one is warranted
in believing claims made by the theory. Consider the most general case: the expected
18Though see (Wallace [2006]), (Wallace [2011]), and (Fraser [2016]).
19I encourage the reader to consult (Fraser [2016]) for a discussion of this topic
complementary to the one here.
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breakdown of the entire theoretical framework of quantum field theory itself. It is well
known that quantum field theory has not provided and probably cannot provide a consis-
tent theory of quantum gravitation, and it is generally believed that the entire theoretical
framework of quantum field theory itself becomes inapplicable at the length scales where
quantum effects of gravity become significant (generally thought to be near the Planck
scale)20. A very general appeal of EFTs is that they explicitly incorporate this inevitable
breakdown of their theoretical framework. EFTs thus provide formal signposts delineat-
ing the physical domains in which one should and should not trust the theory to provide
reliable ontological guidance. By making explicit that the theory becomes inapplicable
beyond a given length scale, EFTs provide some measure of refinement and clarification
of the sense in which quantum field theory is ‘approximately true’; by studying a given
EFT in an entirely ‘internal’ fashion, one can learn that its claims about the properties of
and interactions between its degrees of freedom in one domain – their symmetries, dy-
namics, allowed final states in scattering experiments, and so on – are not a reliable guide
to the world once one pushes the theory beyond a specified length scale. As physicist
Tony Zee puts it in a discussion of EFTs, “I find it sobering and extremely appealing that
theories in physics have the ability to announce their own eventual failure and hence their
domains of validity” (Zee [2010], p. 172). This is one unique way in which EFTs offer
a more precise handle on the sense in which quantum field theories are “approximately
true”.
A second way EFTs can refine the notion of “approximate truth” is that one can ex-
amine the roles different elements of the theoretical framework play in empirical appli-
cations in order to evaluate their physical significance. This is apiece with the divide and
conquer approach to scientific realism sketched at the outset of this section, and the RG
plays an important role in this endeavor. I will focus on one especially salient example
of the role that EFTs can play in distinguishing physical significance from mathematical
artifact. This takes place in the context of lattice quantum field theory: the short-distance
physical breakdown of the theory around some length scale, which I will denote here by
a, is incorporated by placing a quantum field theory on a four-dimensional spatiotempo-
ral lattice with lattice spacing a (instead of a continuum spacetime). Most commonly it
is EFTs that are invariant under a non-abelian gauge symmetry that one formulates this
way – especially quantum chromodynamics (QCD), the theory of the strong interactions
– and for concreteness I will focus on that case. My goal is to illustrate how combining
the RG with applications of lattice QCD allows one to distinguish theoretical structures
with genuine representational content from mere mathematical artifacts. Again for con-
creteness, I will restrict attention to two particular examples: (i) the way one can use the
20However, there is an active research program dedicated to determining whether a
quantum field theory of gravitation may be asymptotically safe: in such a scenario, the
gravitational interaction would obtain a fixed, finite strength at some short distance and
maintain that strength down to arbitrarily short length scales. See (Niedermaier and
Reuter [2006]) for a fairly recent review.
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RG to establish that so-called ‘mirror fermions’ that arise when one formulates an EFT
on a spacetime lattice are mere mathematical artifacts and (ii) how the RG demonstrates
the general physical irrelevance of the specific method chosen for formally incorporating
the breakdown of an EFT21.
Case 1: Mirror Fermions: Mirror fermions arise whenever one attempts to represent
the breakdown of a quantum field theory containing fermions, like electrons or quarks,
with a spacetime lattice22. A well known theorem, the Nielsen-Ninomiya theorem, proves
that any attempt to place a quantum field theory that (i) satisfies a set of physically rea-
sonable conditions and (ii) contains fermion fields on a d-dimensional spacetime lattice
runs into trouble: the ‘latticized’ EFT necessarily contains 2d more fermionic degrees of
freedom than the theory intended to describe23. For instance, if one sets out to give a
quantum field theoretic description of a single, non-interacting fermion field propagat-
ing on a four-dimensional spacetime and attempts to ‘latticize’ the theory, the result is
an EFT on the lattice that now describes 16 fermions! One could reasonably ask how
an EFT containing 15 more fermionic degrees of freedom than the theory intended to
describe could possibly be a source of reliable ontological information. And indeed, a
Standard Interpretation of such an EFT seems to result unavoidably in the conclusion that
the theory’s ontology includes 16 species of fermion – a clear indication, it would seem,
that such a theory is unfit for interpretation24.
I think this attitude is mistaken, and that one can extract reliable ontological informa-
tion as follows. Start by adopting one of several less naive approaches to putting fermions
on a lattice25, which isolate the undesired ‘mirror’ fermions from the physical fermion(s)
one wanted to describe in the first place. After employing a more sophisticated method
for ‘latticization’26, the action S (which contains all the theory’s dynamical information)
has the following form:
21For more details than I can provide in what follows, and for further examples, see
(Kronfeld [2002]) or (Gattringer and Lang [2009]).
22The problem is unique to this particular way of representing the breakdown of the
EFT. The use of a spacetime lattice is very useful for both performing computations and
mathematically rigorously defining EFTs, so physicists have been forced to grapple with
the consequences of the Nielsen-Ninomiya theorem.
23See (Friedan [1982]) for a proof of the theorem, and (Montvay and Munster [1997],
Chapter 4.4) for discussion.
24If one doubts that this would be the result of a Standard Interpretation of the lattice
EFT, I ask them to recall the conclusion of (Fraser [2009]) that an EFT whose
breakdown was represented by a spatial lattice was committed to an ontology according
to which physical space itself has a lattice structure.
25
‘Wilson fermions’ and ‘Kogut-Susskind’ (or ‘staggered’) fermions are two
widespread approaches. See (Montvay and Munster [1997], chapter 4) for details.
26The strategy employed here is called ‘Symanzik improvement’; see (Gattringer and
Lang [2009], chapter 9).
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Slattice = Scontinuum + (ap)Smirror
where Smirror is proportional to some positive power p of the lattice spacing a. The
unwanted mirror fermions are sequestered into a term proportional to the lattice spacing
a, while the physical fermion(s) are contained in Scontinuum, which is independent of a and
dynamically decoupled from the mirror fermions27 By the lights of the divide and conquer
strategy, there is excellent reason to withhold ontological commitment from them (and
other lattice artifacts of similar ilk), even within the EFT framework. The justification
for this goes as follows.
The Standard Interpreter’s claim in this case is that since mirror fermions appear in the
formalism being interpreted, one is committed to including them in the theory’s ontology.
As mentioned above, the mirror fermions are sensitive to the specific choice of the lattice
spacing a, while the physical fermions contained in Scontinuum are not. This means that
while they do appear in the formalism, they do so as part of the short distance, cutoff-
scale physics that one discards in an EFT on principled grounds, since the theory is not
trustworthy in that physical domain. One can cash this out in more detail using the notion
of robustness, our criterion for ontological commitment, as follows.
One lesson of the RG is that choosing a specific value for the cutoff length a is some-
what arbitrary – one can choose any number of different lattice spacings a′ < a without
affecting the empirical predictions of the theory. Furthermore, there are several different
and independent methods for ‘latticizing’ quantum field theories that contain fermions.
Each of these methods produces mirror fermions that manifest differently in the lattice
dynamics S, but in all cases they are dynamically decoupled from Scontinuum and propor-
tional to the lattice spacing. The mirror fermions thus depend on an arbitrary choice of
modeling scheme in a way that genuinely representational quantities in physical theories
do not. On the other hand, in each of these ‘latticization’ schemes the physical dynamics
Scontinuum are insensitive to the specific physical details of the chosen modeling scheme –
in particular, the cutoff length and latticization method – and so remain invariant across
a broad variety of independent methods. Of course, in the terminology used above, this
is just to say that they are robust.
Recalling the two prongs of the divide and conquer strategy, one can say that while
mirror fermions may remain present in the mathematical formalism of lattice QCD (or
any EFT describing fermions on a lattice), they are neither (i) stable and robust elements
of the theory, since they are sensitive to arbitrary choices of the length a of the lattice
spacing and the chosen method of ‘latticization’ in a way that the genuinely physical
fermion(s) are not, and (ii) they do not play an essential role in the empirical success of
the theory. As such, there is little reason to believe that they are candidates for represent-
ing anything ontologically interesting.
27It is worth noting that Smirror may contain other lattice artifacts as well; for a general
treatment of lattice artifacts see (Weisz [2011]).
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Case 2: Recovering Spacetime Symmetries: A related (but distinct) way in which
the RG can identify ‘robust’ physical quantities in an EFT is by demonstrating the dif-
ferential sensitivity of structures in the theoretical framework to the specific way one
chooses to model the physics at the scale of the short-distance breakdown scale28. This
was integral for denying ontological significance to lattice artifacts like mirror fermions,
but this function of the RG is entirely general. In fact, it is one of the essential virtues
of the RG that it provides a tool for determining how changes in the structure of the the-
ory at the scale of the short-distance breakdown affect physics at longer distances where
the theory is empirically reliable. What the RG shows is that the ‘fundamental’ short-
distance structure with which Standard Interpreters are so concerned is largely irrelevant
to the physical content of an EFT in the domain where we have any reason to consider
it empirically reliable. This includes changes in the way we model physics at the scale
of the short-distance breakdown – which includes modeling schemes as diverse as car-
rying out calculations in a non-integer number of spacetime dimensions or introducing
fictional ‘particles’ at the scale of the breakdown29 – but is not limited to this. The RG
also demonstrates that the long-distance structure of the theory is stable across variations
of many physical conditions: one can add (say) (i) a variety of additional (hypothetical)
particles at short distances, including novel interactions between those particles and the
particles included in the EFT; or (ii) vary the strengths of the physical couplings in the
theory; or (iii) incorporate symmetries present at the ‘fundamental’ scale that differ from
those present in the theory at longer length scales, all while leaving unperturbed the struc-
ture of the theory in the physical domains in which it can be subjected to experimental
tests, and has been shown empirically reliable. An EFT at long distances is ‘robust’ in
a way that the the short distance ‘fundamental’ theory is demonstrably not: its entities
and structures at that scale are “accessible (detectable, measurable, derivable, definable,
producible, or the like) in a variety of independent ways,” and so are candidates for being
included in the ontology of that EFT.
In what follows I provide a single, less frequently discussed example which might
be surprising for those inclined to equate a theory’s fundamental ontological structure
with its structure at all scales: the recovery of an EFT whose dynamical equations are
Lorentz invariant even though the dynamics of that same EFT at short distances (i.e. the
‘fundamental’ level) strongly violate those symmetries.
For concreteness30, consider a simple EFT describing a single scalar field Φ that has
28I encourage the reader to consult (Fraser [2016], chapter 5), which contains a
discussion of effective spacetime symmetries in QFT I take as complementary to mine.
It is also worth noting that this is a topic worthy of further philosophical examination, as
is illustrated by (for example) (Collins et al. [2004]).
29The former is called “dimensional regularization” and the latter “Pauli-Villars”
regularization. See (Schwartz [2014], Appendix B) or (Duncan [2012], chapter 16.5) for
a sampling of the many ways to incorporate the short-distance breakdown of EFTs.
30This discussion follows (Moore [2003], pp. 7-8). The switch from QCD to scalar
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been placed on a four-dimensional lattice spacetime, with lattice spacing a. The structure
of the lattice violates Lorentz invariance in multiple ways – for instance, special relativis-
tic spacetimes are symmetric under arbitrary spatial rotations, but on a spacetime lattice
one can only carry out spatial rotations in integer multiples of 90 degrees. The action for
this theory is:
Slattice =
∫
d4x
(∂Φ)2 + g1a2Φ2 + Φ4 +
∑
i
adim(Oi)+4giOi

Only a subset of the interactions in the action violate the symmetries of special rel-
ativity: those multiplied by positive powers of a, all of which are sequestered into the
summation on the right hand side. Starting with this action, one can use the RG to ex-
amine how the structure of the theory changes at length scales L that are long compared
to the lattice spacing a, i.e. in the domain where the theory is empirically adequate. One
finds that the interactions in the summation die off at a rate proportional to (a/L)p for
some positive integer p. For illustration, let a be the Planck length 10−35 meters and L be
the scale at which quarks and gluons become confined into hadrons, L ∼ 10−15 meters.
The symmetry-violating interactions then decay at a rate of (10−20)p ≈ 0; in practice, one
often allows L → ∞ since this proves a perfectly reasonable approximation for L ≫ a.
The result is that in the physical domain L ≫ a where the EFT actually provides reliable
ontological guidance, the only interactions that remain in its dynamics are those invariant
under Lorentz transformations. Thus, beginning with an EFT that contained interactions
at the ‘fundamental’ level that violate the symmetries of special relativity, one obtains a
fully Lorentz invariant theory in the long-distance domain where one expects the theory
to be physically trustworthy31.
Recall that the primary purpose of this particular example was to illustrate that the RG
field theory is motivated by the fact that φ4 theory is infrared free, i.e. the couplings go
to zero as the length scales at which we are examining the the structure of the theory get
arbitrarily long. This allows us to maintain analytic control over the theory (and over the
RG flow) at the long distance scales where the irrelevant operators that break Lorentz
invariance die off and an “effective” or “emergent” Lorentz invariance is restored. In the
case of QCD, the couplings get larger at long distances, eventually leading to the
confinement of the quark and gluon degrees of freedom. This is a region of QCD over
which we do not have particularly good analytic control, and have to resort to computers
and numerical methods. My thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me to clarify
this choice.
31To be mathematically precise, one actually ‘latticizes’ the theory in Euclidean
spacetime for reasons of mathematical tractability, and then recovers invariance under
the group of four-dimensional rotations O(4), the Euclidean spacetime analogue of the
Lorentz invariance of special relativity. Full Lorentz invariance is recovered by then
analytically continuing the theory from Euclidean spacetime back to Minkowski
spacetime.
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can refine and clarify the notion of “approximate truth” by identifying which theoretical
entities and structures in a quantum field theory are ‘robust’ and which are likely mere
mathematical artifacts. It also suggests two further conclusions. First, it functions as
a response to those such as (Fraser, Fraser [2009, 2011]) who want to assign physical
significance to the fact that (some) methods of representing the short-distance failure of
EFTs violate the symmetries of special relativity. Fraser argues that one cannot confine
the ontological significance of such violations to physical domains in which the theory
is empirically inadequate anyway – they affect the physical content of the theory at all
distance scales. As she puts it in (Fraser [2009], p. 560), “[c]utting off the theory at
some short-distance scale has the effect of changing the content of the theory as a whole,
including its description of long-distance scales.” I take the examples presented here to
go some way toward demonstrating this is mistaken: as long as one is not in the grip
of Standard Interpretation, they are justified in denying that mathematical artifacts at the
scale of an EFT’s breakdown carry any ontological significance.
The second conclusion these examples suggest is that we can be misled about the
reliable ontological information provided by a quantum field theory by interpreting only
its empirically unreliable ‘fundamental’ structure and conflating that with its structure
at all scales. It is a mistake to think that one can simply read a quantum field theory’s
ontology off its ‘fundamental’ mathematical structure. The next section develops in more
detail the implications this has for our interpretational practice and for the ontological
commitments of EFTs.
3.2 Scales and Ontology
In section 3.1, I argued that by interpreting EFTs one has resources to make fine-grained
distinctions between mathematical artifice and physical significance, which supports a
‘divide and conquer’ approach to ontological commitment. I contrasted this with an
excessively egalitarian approach to ontological commitment: Standard Interpreters treat
all of the entities and structures of a theory’s mathematical framework (at least those
at the ‘fundamental’ level) as on more or less equal ontological footing. This is one
symptom of the ‘fetishism of mathematics’ diagnosed earlier by Stachel.
In this section, I argue that attending to EFTs also makes clear that for many quantum
field theories, any interpretation that enables those theories to ‘discharge their scientific
duties’ must include higher-level entities in its ontology32. This is particularly true of
their explanatory duties, and it is on these that I will focus here33. The contrast again is
32This section touches on a number of issues that are contentious in the mainstream
metaphysics literature. In particular, the discussion may benefit from more direct
engagement with the ongoing discussions of fundamentality and grounding there; length
constraints prohibit pursuing this engagement here, but I thank an anonymous referee
for flagging the issue.
33I do not have any particular account of scientific explanation in mind. All that I
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with Standard Interpretation: while its insufficiently discriminating approach to a theory’s
mathematical structure leaves it open to too much ontological commitment, its focus on
only the ‘fundamental’ structure of quantum field theories leaves it prone to committing
simultaneously to too little.
As an example, consider34 (Fraser [2008], p. 856) in which a theory’s ontology is
straightforwardly equated with its fundamental ontology: “[t]he point at issue is whether
entities with certain properties – particlelike properties – exist. More precisely, does
QFT support the inclusion of particlelike entities as fundamental entities in our ontol-
ogy?” After answering ‘no’, Fraser entertains the response that “quanta are not part of
the ontology of fundamental entities described by QFT, but...that nevertheless quanta do
exist according to QFT.” Her response epitomizes the ‘fundamentalism’ I have attributed
to Standard Interpreters: “[f]or this to be a viable response, the cogency of the distinc-
tion between fundamental and less fundamental entities must be defended and a case
must be made for admitting additional, non-fundamental entities into our ontology....the
important question – which remains outstanding – is not the status of quanta, but what
fundamental entities are allowed into our ontology by QFT” (pp. 857-8) (my emphasis).
As I stated above, focusing exclusively on fundamental ontology in this fashion leaves
one with an interpretation unequipped to support the theory in the performance of its ex-
planatory duties. By paying attention the applications of EFTs and the RG, it becomes
clear that many explanatory affirmations made in the theory simply cannot be made true
by including in one’s ontology only those entities at the fundamental scale. I emphasize
that as long as one grants that scientific explanations aim at providing an at least mini-
mally illuminating and manageable account of their explananda, there is good reason to
believe that the “cannot” in the previous sentence will not be eliminated by some “future
complete physics” or “in principle” explanations in terms of the fundamental ontology.
This belief can be in part motivated by considerations of the sort discussed in section 3.1,
where we saw that the fundamental structure of a quantum field theory can be in many
respects irrelevant for answering why-questions about its behavior at longer distances.
I will focus on a specific example in quantum field theory, that of ‘confinement’, that I
think makes the motivation for this belief especially salient. This story is itself rather
general – the phenomenon of confinement is present in any quantum field theory which
require in what follows is this, which I hope is relatively uncontroversial: whatever else
they do, scientific explanations necessarily aim at providing practitioners with some
sense of understanding of the explanandum. I should note, however, that there is an
argument to be made that I require more than this: in particular, the recommendation of
(Saatsi [2016]) that any explanationist argument for realism be situated within a
particular articulated account of scientific explanation puts pressure on my lack of
commitment to any such account here. I thank an anonymous referee for bringing
Saatsi’s paper to my attention.
34Recall also the quotes above from (Arntzenius [2014]) and (North [2009]), and the
references in fn. 12.
19
is invariant under a non-abelian gauge symmetry – but for concreteness I will focus on
an example of considerable physical import: the confinement of quarks and gluons into
hadronic bound states in QCD at long distances35.
At the shortest distances at which it is empirically valid36, QCD describes the interac-
tions of quark and gluon fields via the strong force. Consider a schematic version of the
QCD dynamics:
SQCD = Sgluon + Squark + Sinteraction
The physical degrees of freedom appearing in the dynamics of QCD at short distances
are quarks and gluons, with the final term representing their interactions. When interac-
tions between these fields are relatively weak, as they are in QCD at short distances, a
description in terms of quark and gluon particles is available and explanatorily powerful.
Calculations performed in the theory at this distance scale have played an enormous role
in cementing QCD as the appropriate theory of the strong interaction37, and it is these
physical degrees of freedom that appear in the fundamental dynamics of the Standard
Model of particle physics. It may therefore seem natural to conclude that an interpre-
tation of QCD requires the admission of quark and gluon fields to one’s ontology, but
nothing more. This would almost surely constitute the Standard Interpretation of the
ontology of QCD, at least38.
Such an interpretation of QCD would leave it unable to discharge its explanatory du-
ties, and thus fails qua interpretation by the standard of (Ruetsche [2011]) that I have
adopted here. Studying the behavior of QCD at long distances, using the RG and tech-
niques of lattice QCD, reveals that QCD has a rich, scale-dependent structure that is
hidden from the perspective of the fundamental level. It also reveals that many physical
processes involving these long-distance structures in QCD are not explicable purely us-
ing the dynamics and degrees of freedom present at the fundamental level. The feature of
QCD responsible for this is that the strength of the interaction between quark and gluon
fields increases as one considers the structure of the theory at longer distances. This
35To be more precise: any non-abelian gauge theory is confining as long as it meets
certain other fairly mild conditions – it must not have too many scalar or fermion fields,
for instance.
36As a piece of mathematics QCD is mathematically consistent to arbitrarily short
distances, in the sense that its interactions get weaker at short distances, reducing to a
theory with no interactions at all in the continuum limit. It is, of course, still not
physically reliable at those arbitrarily short distances.
37See (Collins [2011]) for a thorough presentation of QCD in this domain
38Presumably such an interpretation would then go on to question whether one must
represent the quarks and gluons in the fundamental ontology as elementary particles, or
only the corresponding quark and gluon quantum fields, or gauge-invariant Wilson
loops, or something else entirely. Such questions, while interesting, are not my concern
here.
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gives rise to ‘confinement’, the phenomenon I think most clearly illustrates the scale-
dependence of the ontology of QCD. Roughly, a quantum field theory is ‘confining’ if,
beyond a certain length scale, the strength of the interactions between its short-distance
degrees of freedom become so strong as to make explanations of phenomena in terms of
particulate states of those fundamental fields intractable and (even if one could provide
such a description) entirely unenlightening. In QCD, the fundamental quarks and gluons
become confined into hadrons (particles like the proton and neutron, which are bound
states of quarks and gluons), preventing particulate states at length scales longer than
about 10−15 meters.
This is unlike other familiar bound states, such as a hydrogen atom, in the following
sense. In those cases, bound states form under certain energetic conditions, but under
other common conditions one can also scatter sufficiently energetic electrons off of a
proton and let the two become separated by very long distances without a bound state
being formed. The situation is different in the case of quarks and gluons. In that case, it is
nomologically impossible to separate a pair of particulate states of quark or gluon fields
by a distance of more than about 10−15 meters. Imagine a tiny experimentalist living
inside of a hadron, attempting to pull quarks apart. She would discover, presumably
after much exertion, that it is impossible to separate them to distances greater than the
confinement scale.
This prevents these degrees of freedom from being dynamically active on length scales
longer than the confinement scale, which means that they play neither an observational
nor explanatory role in physical processes taking place above that scale39. Rather than
quarks and gluons, the degrees of freedom appearing there are bound states: hadrons
(like pions, protons, and neutrons) which have different properties (they lack the ‘color
charge’ that quarks and gluons possess, for example), interact via dynamics with a differ-
ent structure than the fundamental QCD dynamics, and which are invariant under differ-
ent symmetries than is QCD at short distances.
It is true that starting from the fundamental QCD dynamics, one can derive that the fun-
damental degrees of freedom are confined into hadrons at around 10−15 meters40. How-
ever, if one wants to explain physical processes characterized by length scales longer
than this – the binding of atoms into molecules, for example – it is a matter of physical
law that one cannot ‘zoom out’ to those length scales without a description in terms of
particulate states of quark and gluon fields becoming wildly intractable and devoid of
39This isn’t to deny that some properties of hadrons, like their masses, are best
explained by the properties and interactions of their constituent quark and gluon fields.
It is simply to state that the dynamics of quarks and gluons do not explain the hadronic
dynamical behavior, and that one cannot explain hadronic behavior, such as
proton-proton scattering, solely in terms of quark and gluon states.
40At least in the sense of ‘derive’ used in physical practice. A fully mathematically
rigorous derivation remains elusive, although there is also overwhelming numerical
evidence of confinement from computational studies of lattice QCD.
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explanatory power, and one is required to replace such a description by one in terms of
hadrons. Furthermore, the hadronic degrees of freedom play an integral role in a tremen-
dous number of empirical applications and explanations of physical phenomena, such as
those currently taking place at the LHC.
On this last point: due to the confinement of the quarks and gluons, the strongly-
interacting particles that experimenters actually prepare, manipulate, and observe in parti-
cle physics experiments are hadrons, not quarks and gluons. Furthermore, experimenters
and theorists also employ hadrons to explain the results of those experiments: almost
every high energy scattering event at the LHC produces so-called ‘jets’ of hadrons which
are then observed in particle detectors, and the details of their production are integral
for explaining the scattering event (see for example (Schwartz [2014], Chapter 36)). As
(Montvay and Munster [1997], p. 231) put it, “the transformation of the perturbative
predictions at the parton (i.e. quark and gluon) level to the hadronic incoming and out-
going states cannot be done without some knowledge of...confinement phenomena” (my
emphasis)41 So in this very flat-footed sense, an interpretation of QCD that does not ad-
mit higher-level entities like hadrons into its ontology fails almost immediately its task
of enabling the theory to discharge its scientific duties. In fact, this is a special case of
a rather general principle about the explanation of experimental results: in the words of
(Wimsatt [2007], p. 210),42 “[t]he fact that most direct interactions of something at a
level of organization will be with other things at that level means that detectors of entities
at a level...will interact with it via properties characteristic of that level. [...] For these
reasons, and for others, eliminative reduction is often not possible, necessary, or desirable
– our very instruments anchor us...at the level we are observing.” In the case of QCD,
Wimsatt’s principle is a corollary of the fact that any description of any strong-interaction
process at distances longer than the confinement scale in terms of particulate states of the
quark and gluon fields will be entirely devoid of explanatory power. So our guiding inter-
pretive principle – that an interpretation enable a theory to discharge its scientific duties
– entails that any interpretation of QCD had better include, at minimum, higher-level
entities like hadronic bound states along with quarks and gluons in its ontology.
QCD thus provides a case in which even though one knows that some higher-level
41The situation with the top quark is subtle. Top quarks do not live long enough to
form hadronic bound states themselves, instead decaying semi-weakly (most commonly
into a b-quark and a W-boson). The b-quarks do undergo hadronization and this is a
source of theoretical and experimental uncertainty in the determination of top quark
observables. So although top quarks themselves do not undergo hadronization, top
quark phenomenologists are forced to deal with confinement phenomena; see (Olive
et al. [2014]) for discussion. This has motivated the construction of top quark
observables that minimize sensitivity to b-quark hadronization; see (Stieger [2016]) for
a recent discussion. My thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to
investigate some of the subtleties of top quark phenomenology.
42A somewhat similar point is made in (Wallace [2012], chapter 2).
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entities are composite states of more fundamental entities, one cannot explain the be-
havior of those higher-level entities solely in terms of the behavior of the fundamental
level. Recall that this story about confinement of fundamental degrees of freedom at long
distances has some generality: it will occur in any quantum field theory which is invari-
ant under non-abelian gauge symmetries43 – precisely the sort of theories which make
up the Standard Model of particle physics. This is yet another way in which EFTs and
the RG provide us with improved realist commitments: they reveal absolutely physical
information that is obscured from the perspective of the Standard Interpreter.
I began by asking what sort of scientific realism could be grounded by EFTs, and I
will close with a few remarks on that theme. It demands that we distinguish reliable
ontological information from theoretical artifacts, and requires attending in detail to the
way theories are applied in practice to do so, in line with my earlier advocacy for the
divide and conquer strategy. The result is a more discerning sort of realism, and one
that gives the lie to the idea that we can simply read a physical theory’s ontological
commitments off of its fundamental mathematical framework. I take this to be a feature,
not a bug: the idea that one could responsibly do otherwise seems to me to always have
been a mistake.
For this sort of realism it is important that a theory have a broad range of empirical
applications44. However, this is not to say that the ontological commitments of an EFT are
restricted to its “observable” content. It just emphasizes something that has come to be
overlooked by philosophers of physics: examining in detail how a theory makes contact
with the world offers important guidance in determining which features of the theory
have a genuine representational function and which are excess structure. I should note
that I don’t believe that attending to empirical applications is the only method of sorting
ontological wheat from theoretical chaff – I have emphasized the importance of the RG in
the context of EFTs, and different theoretical contexts are likely to have similar ‘locally’
useful tools. I think it is in general, however, the most important method. Finally, I noted
at the outset that one of the original motivations for the divide and conquer strategy was
that the ontological commitments it entails are entities and structures that are likely to
survive episodes of theory change. In the case of quantum field theory, such an episode
is inevitable – the need for a theory of quantum gravity is almost certain to produce a
theory describing physics at short-distances that differs dramatically from quantum field
theory. In light of this virtual guarantee that theory change is on the horizon, I think the
ability of EFTs and the RG to identify entities and structures that are robust and insulated
against such short-distances changes should be appealing to would-be realists.
43Again, as long as it satisfies certain other fairly mild conditions; see fn. 35.
44Arguably, any theory that doesn’t isn’t a physical theory at all.
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4 Conclusion
Our mistake is not that we take our theories too seriously, but that we do not
take them seriously enough. It is always hard to realize that these numbers
and equations we play with at our desks have something to do with the real
world. – Steven Weinberg (Weinberg [1993])
To be sure, Weinberg’s remark has to be applied with care. Although his
desk has played host to an inordinate amount of mathematics that has proved
relevant to the real world, far from every equation with which we theorists
tinker rises to that level. In the absence of compelling experimental or obser-
vational results, deciding which mathematics should be taken seriously is as
much art as it is science. – Brian Greene (Greene [2011])
I have argued that a widespread approach to the interpretation of quantum field theories
is misguided, and have proposed an alternative “effective” replacement. This approach
offers a more discerning approach scientific realism that does not share the Standard In-
terpreters’ quixotic focus on fundamental structure, and aims to identify robust structures
that will survive future episodes of theory change. It is is well-grounded in both the
theoretical framework and empirical applications of our best scientific theories.
In closing, I again want to forestall any misconception of an anti-metaphysical spirit
on my part and emphasize that I agree with Weinberg that failing to take our theories
seriously is a mistake; it is far from any brand of instrumentalism that I am endorsing
here. Indeed, I take it that providing a corrective to the mistake that Weinberg diagnoses is
part of the motivation of many philosophers of physics, myself included. However, I have
argued here that such a corrective has come to be applied indiscriminately – Standard
Interpreters are guilty of the opposite mistake of taking the mathematical structures of
our theories too seriously. The pendulum has swung too far in the other direction. They
have ignored the way these theories make contact with the real world and proceed as if
every nook and cranny of the theoretical framework carries equal representational claim,
overlooking the bit of wisdom captured by Greene’s cautionary note. I think Greene is
correct that determining the ontological implications of our physical theories, above and
beyond their observational implications, contains considerable amounts of art as well as
science, and it is a task well-suited for philosophers. I just think that, for the reasons
I’ve outlined in this paper, the philosophical project of scientific realism will be better
grounded, and more promising, if we introduce more attention to science into the state of
the art.
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